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 Has the Charter Made a Difference 
for People with Disabilities? 
Reflections and Strategies for  
the 21st Century 
Ravi Malhotra* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canada was one of the very first countries in the world to incorporate 
equality provisions for people with physical and mental disabilities 
directly in its Constitution.1 Influenced by both the International Year of 
Disabled Persons declared by the United Nations in 1981 and grassroots 
mobilization by disability rights advocates, section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms held out the promise that people with 
disabilities were to be regarded as equal to other citizens.2 How can we 
evaluate the fulfillment of this promise three decades later? Are those 
whom some have labelled Charter skeptics correct in regarding legal 
strategies as a diversion from more important grassroots political 
struggles?3 Or is a more nuanced conclusion warranted? 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. I 
serve on the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities (“CCD”), 
Canada’s leading cross-disability human rights organization, which engages in decision-making on 
CCD’s litigation strategies. The views expressed in this paper are my own and not the views of the 
CCD. Thanks to Daniel Tucker-Simmons for editing assistance. 
1 Pauline Rosenbaum & Ena Chadha, “Reconstructing Disability: Integrating Disability 
Theory into Section 15” (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 343, at 343 [hereinafter “Rosenbaum & Chadha”]. 
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”], states: “Every 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on ... mental or 
physical disability.” 
2 Note that the original draft of s. 15 did not include people with disabilities as many policy-
makers were concerned that the costs of disability accommodation would be exorbitant. See Yvonne 
Peters, “The Constitution and the Disabled” (1993) 2 Health L. Rev. 1, at para. 25. 
3 See, e.g., Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in 
Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 1989); Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional 
Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). For an important earlier 
consideration of the efficacy of legal strategies for achieving social transformation for people with 
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In this short paper, I use the lens of critical disability theory to argue 
that while the convoluted evolution of the section 15 jurisprudence in 
recent years certainly leaves much to be desired and marks a retreat from 
the early promise of substantive equality, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has repeatedly if not consistently embraced the core vision articulated by 
disability rights advocates. By this I mean that the Court has come some 
distance to embracing a social model understanding of disablement even 
though barriers continue to be widespread in public settings such as 
restaurants, schools and stores. The social model stands for the proposi-
tion that it is largely structural barriers that unnecessarily impede the 
lives of people with disabilities, and that the focus of public policy 
should be on a societal commitment to eliminating barriers and providing 
accommodation rather than altering the person with a disability. Stair-
cases prevent wheelchair users from entering restaurants, clubs and 
homes, and print materials preclude blind and visually impaired people 
from timely access to information. In contrast, the medical model has 
devoted its energies primarily to rehabilitation, charity, cure and preven-
tion of disability. Its focus is on ameliorating impairment in the disabled 
person’s body and regarding the situation as tragic when this cannot be 
achieved.4 Moreover, this articulation of the social model is true even in 
cases where disability rights advocates have ultimately lost on the merits. 
Although there is no doubt that the evolution of section 15 jurisprudence 
in the Supreme Court of Canada has been troubling, with an increasing 
                                                                                                             
disabilities, see Sarah Armstong, “Disability Advocacy in the Charter Era” (2003) 2 J. L. & Equality 
33 (rejecting both the conservative and radical critiques of the Charter in the context of disability 
rights). 
4 The disability studies literature is vast and there are numerous variants of the social mod-
el. The canonical reference is Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 
1990). Very recently, Michael Oliver and Colin Barnes released an updated version. See Michael 
Oliver & Colin Barnes, The New Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 2012). See also Gary 
L. Albrecht, Katherine D. Seelman & Michael Bury, eds., Handbook of Disability Studies (Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage, 2001) and Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a 
New Civil Rights Movement (New York: Times Books, 1993) (discussing the American disability 
rights movement). For an important analysis of Canadian jurisprudence using critical disability 
theory, see Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds., Critical Disability Theory: Essays in Philosophy, 
Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006). I do not consider 
the universalist model whereby impairments are regarded as a spectrum on which each and every 
individual is simply on a different point. While it has some superficial appeal, I do not think it is 
helpful to legal analysis and regard it as disorienting. But see Rosenbaum & Chadha, supra, note 1, 
at 350; Jonathan Penney, “A Constitution for the Disabled or a Disabled Constitution? — Toward 
a New Approach to Disability for the Purposes of Section 15(1)” (2002) 1 J.L. & Equality 83, at 
para. 35. 
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tendency by the Court to dismiss section 15 claims in more recent years,5 
two recent developments, Canada’s ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities6 and the promulga-
tion of regulations pursuant to the Accessibility for Ontarians with 
Disabilities Act, 20057 after many long and hard years of lobbying8 are 
particularly promising and deserve closer attention by constitutional law 
scholars. Advocates of critical disability theory nevertheless need to 
remain vigilant and push courts and tribunals to exemplify reasoning 
consistent with the principles of substantive equality. 
At the outset, three aspects of disability politics in general and peo-
ple with disabilities as an identity community in particular are worth 
noting for contextual background. First, people with disabilities remain 
among the most marginalized Canadians and this fact needs to be kept in 
mind in all contexts in which constitutional jurisprudence is considered. 
Even the most cursory foray into sociology bears out this assertion. 
People with disabilities remain disproportionately impoverished, are far 
less likely to have secured full-time employment, and attain lower 
education levels when compared with their able-bodied peers.9 Like 
many other minority groups, people with disabilities are also under-
represented in corporate boardrooms and legislative assemblies across 
the country.10 Second, people with disabilities are extremely diverse. The 
category encompasses a wide range of conditions, including people with 
sensory conditions, mobility impairments, learning disabilities, psychiat-
                                                                                                             
5 Bruce Ryder & Taufiq Hashmani, “Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme 
Court of Canada’s Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989-2010” in 
J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 505, at 506 [hereinafter “Ryder & Hashmani”] 
(noting a drop of nearly 50 per cent in established s. 15 claims in Supreme Court rulings between 
2004 and 2009 compared to previous years). 
6 G.A. Res. 61/106 (2007) [hereinafter “CRPD”]. 
7 S.O. 2005, c. 11 [hereinafter “AODA”]. 
8 Essential reading for understanding the social movement that eventually led to the AODA 
is M. David Lepofsky, “The Long, Arduous Road to a Barrier-Free Ontario for People with 
Disabilities: The History of the Ontarians with Disabilities Act — The First Chapter” (2004) 15 
N.J.C.L. 125 [hereinafter “Lepofsky, ‘Long’”] (outlining the political mobilization for disability 
rights legislation in Ontario between 1994 and 2003). 
9 Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Yvonne Peters, Accommodation in the 21st Century 
(2012), at 2, online: Canadian Human Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/proactive_
initiatives/default-eng.aspx>. As recently as 2006, they note that nearly one-half of all people with 
disabilities were not employed. 
10 That said, in recent years, wheelchair users have been elected to office in Alberta, British 
Columbia and the House of Commons. Stephanie Cadieux and Stephen Fletcher have served in the 
British Columbia and federal cabinets, respectively. The history of candidates with disabilities 
running for public office requires further research. The author is currently writing a book-length 
biography, with Benjamin Isitt, on a double amputee, E.T. Kingsley, who ran for both the British 
Columbia Legislature and the House of Commons numerous times between 1907 and 1926. 
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ric disabilities and much more. At times, this makes articulating a 
cohesive vision particularly challenging in a world where presenting a 
straightforward story is important for media coverage and for acquiring 
support by policy decision-makers.11 Finally, people with disabilities face 
unique challenges in that, unlike most other identity communities, those 
born with disabilities very rarely share a disability identity with their 
parents. This means that disability rights consciousness must be fostered 
anew with each generation outside the home, creating significant 
political challenges and requiring constant outreach.12 
What does the duty to accommodate entail? Since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations 
Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ 
Union, we have enunciated a unified bona fide occupational requirement 
test that does not distinguish between adverse effect and direct discrimi-
nation.13 As Lepofsky has argued, there are three key aspects to the duty 
to accommodate: (1) a duty to remove existing barriers that preclude a 
person with a disability from participating in existing services covered by 
the equality guarantee; (2) a duty to take interim steps to provide indi-
vidualized accommodation where it proves impossible to immediately 
remove barriers; and (3) a continuing obligation to prevent the creation 
of future barriers.14 The legal test for evaluating whether a workplace 
rule or standard constitutes a bona fide occupational requirement adopted 
                                                                                                             
11 Samuel R. Bagenstos has written compelling scholarship on how framing disability rights 
legislation as welfare reform that would be cost effective acted as a narrative that unified an 
otherwise divided disability rights movement in the United States. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “The 
Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform” (2003) 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 921. In the 
worst-case scenario, disability rights advocates may adopt completely different positions in the same 
case, as has occurred during constitutional litigation regarding the funding of treatment for people 
with autism. See Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”] (finding the province’s failure to fund a 
novel therapy for children with autism did not violate s. 15). 
12 For a thoughtful inquiry into the origins of disability rights consciousness among a sam-
ple of Americans with disabilities, see David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: 
Law and Identity in the Life Stories of Americans with Disabilities (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003). The author is currently writing a monograph, with Morgan Rowe, on rights conscious-
ness and identity based on in-depth interviews with 12 Canadian adults with physical disabilities. 
13 [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mei-
orin”]. An example of direct discrimination would be “No Blacks allowed”, while a height 
requirement would be a simple example of adverse-effect discrimination. Prior to Meiorin, some 
courts did not require a respondent who was held to have engaged in direct discrimination to 
accommodate, leading to absurd results. On this point, see M. David Lepofsky, “The Charter’s 
Guarantee of Equality to People with Disabilities — How Well is It Working?” (1998) 16 Windsor 
Y.B. Access Just. 155, at 167-68 [hereinafter “Lepofsky, ‘The Charter’s Guarantee’”]. 
14 Lepofsky, “The Charter’s Guarantee”, id., at 169. 
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by the courts is quite similar. The three-part Meiorin test subjects 
potentially discriminatory workplace standards to scrutiny and inquires: 
(1) Has the employer (or service provider) adopted the standard for a 
purpose rationally connected to performance? 
(2) Did the employer or service provider adopt the standard in an honest 
and good faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfillment of that 
purpose? 
(3) Has the employer or service provider demonstrated that the standard 
is reasonably necessary? 
To demonstrate that the standard is reasonably necessary, the employer 
must show that it is impossible to accommodate employees with the 
characteristics of the claimant without experiencing undue hardship.15 
In Part II, I evaluate selected Supreme Court decisions, including key 
section 15 rulings relating to education discrimination, pension benefit 
claims and discrimination in the provision of hospital services and a 
tribunal decision relating to accessibility of the railways. These cases 
encompass landmark victories that people with disabilities will cherish 
for years to come as well as disappointing losses that haunt us. In Part 
III, I suggest that the frustrations of the evolution of the section 15 
jurisprudence more broadly may be balanced by the new opportunities 
presented by Canada’s ratification of the CRPD and legislation such as 
the AODA. 
II. THE SECTION 15 CASE LAW ON DISABILITY RIGHTS 
Before discussing the section 15 case law with respect to disability 
rights, it is useful to have a brief overview of the evolution of section 15 
case law. In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,16 the first 
section 15 case, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in a decision striking 
down a citizenship requirement for members of the Bar that the focus 
should be on substantive equality, which does not necessarily entail 
identical treatment if the situation does not warrant it, and observed 
that insisting on it may well lead to inequality. Unfortunately, the case 
law became increasingly convoluted over time. The Supreme Court set 
out to clarify the law in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
                                                                                                             
15 Meiorin, supra, note 13, at para. 54. 
16 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”] 
(rejecting similarly situated test). 
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Immigration)17 by requiring claimants to demonstrate a violation of 
human dignity, guided by four contextual factors. As Ryder and Hash-
mani have correctly noted, however, the section 15 jurisprudence has 
remained mired in confusion.18 While space restrictions preclude a 
detailed discussion, the requirement that claimants articulate an appro-
priate comparator group has derailed many equality rights claims. The 
Court’s analysis has unfortunately often been sidetracked into obscure 
and pedantic interpretations of whether a claimant has selected the 
appropriate comparator group.19 The failure to select the correct group has 
often been fatal to the claim.20 Second, the requirement to demonstrate a 
violation of human dignity has stymied some claimants’ ability to demon-
strate that they were subject to discrimination.21 Although the Court 
appears to have acknowledged these flaws in the recent decisions in R. v. 
Kapp22 and Withler v. Canada (Attorney General),23 where the Court 
adopted a test inquiring (1) whether the impugned law creates a distinction 
based on an enumerated or analogous ground; and (2) whether the distinc-
tion creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping,24 it 
                                                                                                             
17 [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Law”]. The Law test queries whether the law under scrutiny (i) draws a distinction based on 
personal characteristics that amounts to differential treatment; (ii) based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground; (iii) that causes discrimination “by imposing a burden upon or withholding a 
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed group 
or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view 
that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a human being or as a member 
of Canadian society”. See id., at para. 88. 
18 Ryder & Hashmani, supra, note 5, at 515. 
19 Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada 
Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111 [hereinafter “Gilbert & Majury, 
‘Critical’”]. 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Leslie A. Reaume, “Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory Human 
Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” [hereinafter “Reaume”] in Fay Faraday, Margaret 
Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality 
Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 373, at 398; Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: 
Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 627 [hereinafter “Gilbert, ‘Time’”]. 
But see Lee Ann Basser, “Human Dignity” in Marcia H. Rioux, Lee Ann Basser & Melinda Jones, 
eds., Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and Disability Law (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011) 17 [hereinafter “Rioux, Basser & Jones”] (defending the concept of dignity as 
crucial for disability rights). 
22 [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”] 
(dismissing a s. 15 challenge to an Aboriginal communal fishing licence). 
23 [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, 2011 SCC 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”] 
(upholding a legislative framework that made distinctions based on age for supplementary death 
benefits). 
24 Kapp, supra, note 22, at para. 17. The Court in both Kapp and Withler, id., cited Gilbert, 
“Time”, supra, note 21 and Gilbert & Majury, “Critical”, supra, note 19. 
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remains to be seen whether future decisions can rectify what critical 
scholars have justifiably regarded as an excessively convoluted jurispru-
dence that does not provide clear guidance to litigants. 
Sixteen major cases specifically addressing disability rights issues, 
frequently but not exclusively in the section 15 or statutory human rights 
context, have been heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in the last 30 
years.25 In many of these cases, disability rights organizations were active 
                                                                                                             
25 How one selects such a list is inevitably always subject to debate. The Supreme Court 
cases I identify are: E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] S.C.J. No. 60, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.) (the Court 
refuses to authorize non-therapeutic sterilization for a woman with an intellectual disability); R. v. 
Swain, [1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.) (automatic detention of individuals found 
not criminally responsible by reason of insanity is found to be unconstitutional); Rodriguez v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) (the majority finds 
that the provision in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 prohibiting assisted suicide does not 
violate the Charter rights of those who require assistance); Battlefords and District Co-operative Ltd. 
v. Gibbs, [1996] S.C.J. No. 55, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.) (the distinction between insurance 
benefits provided to employees with physical disabilities and those with mental disabilities violated 
the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1); Eaton v. Brant County Board of 
Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eaton”] (no presump-
tion of integration in educational settings for students with disabilities is required by s. 15); Eldridge 
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Eldridge”] (the government’s failure to provide sign language interpretation to Deaf 
patients seeking medical treatment violated s. 15); Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric 
Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) (Criminal Code provisions for accused 
persons found not criminally responsible do not violate the Charter); British Columbia (Superinten-
dent of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] S.C.J. No. 73, 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 868 (S.C.C.) (failure to provide an individualized driving test to man with a visual 
impairment violated the British Columbia Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210); Québec 
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), [2000] S.C.J. 
No. 29, 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mercier”] (medical anomalies 
need not demonstrate physical impairments to constitute disabilities under the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12); Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Granovsky”] 
(holding that the rule requiring recent contributions to a pension plan for eligibility did not violate s. 
15); Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation 
Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”] (finding 
that chronic pain regulations that limited income benefits to injured workers with chronic pain 
violated s. 15); Auton, supra, note 11; Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail Canada 
Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 15, 2007 SCC 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Via Rail”] (the 
majority restored the decision of the Canadian Transportation Agency ordering retrofitting of 
railway cars for passengers with disabilities); Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays, [2008] S.C.J. No. 40, 
2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 362 (S.C.C.) (dismissal of an employee with chronic fatigue 
syndrome did not demonstrate sufficiently malicious and egregious conduct to warrant aggravated or 
punitive damages); and R. v. Dinardo, [2008] S.C.J. No. 24, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788 
(S.C.C.) (a new trial was ordered where a woman with intellectual disabilities alleging sexual assault 
made inconsistent statements). In March 2012, the Supreme Court heard the appeal in British 
Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2097, 2010 BCCA 478 (B.C.C.A.), 
affg [2008] B.C.J. No. 348, 2008 BCSC 264 (B.C.S.C.), revg [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580, 2005 
BCHRT 580 (B.C.H.R.T.) [hereinafter “Moore”] (the majority concluded that the lower court 
correctly quashed a human rights tribunal decision finding that failure to provide specialized services 
to a student with severe dyslexia violated the British Columbia Human Rights Code). 
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interveners, making arguments to encourage the adoption of principles in 
keeping with the social model.26 Two of the most disappointing decisions 
for disability rights advocates were the decisions in Eaton v. Brant 
County Board of Education,27 which upheld a segregated educational 
setting for a young girl with cerebral palsy as consistent with her equality 
rights, and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion),28 which upheld the provision in the legislative framework funding 
federal disability pensions which requires employees to make regular and 
recent contributions in order to be entitled to a disability pension. On the 
other hand, Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),29 requiring 
the state to fund sign language interpreters for Deaf patients in hospitals, 
likely represents the most significant victory for progress under section 
15 for people with disabilities to date.30 Finally, while not a Charter case 
per se, the relatively recent — and sharply divided — decision of the 
Supreme Court in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. Via Rail 
Canada Inc.31 granting victory to the Council sheds light on equality for 
people with disabilities in the vital area of accessing public transportation 
and warrants close attention. These four decisions are highlighted 
because they collectively illustrate the Court’s evolving understanding of 
the social model of disablement and it is striking to note how the Court 
often articulated a progressive understanding of the social model even 
where it found against the claimant on the merits. 
1. Eaton 
Emily Eaton was a 12-year-old child with cerebral palsy placed by 
her school board in a segregated setting, against the wishes of her 
                                                                                                             
26 This paper inevitably can analyze only selected decisions due to space constraints. Ac-
cordingly, I do not exhaustively survey religious or gender accommodation cases such as Ontario 
(Human Rights Commission) v. Simpson-Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 
(S.C.C.) and Meiorin, supra, note 13, which of course remain very influential for the emergence of 
disability rights law and human rights jurisprudence more broadly in creating a unified bona fide 
occupational requirement test. See Dianne Pothier, “Tackling Disability Discrimination, at Work: 
Toward a Systemic Approach” (2010) McGill J.L. & Health 17, at para. 24. For my account of how 
the Canadian religious accommodation jurisprudence, unencumbered by American First Amendment 
doctrines prohibiting congressional establishment of religion, influenced the evolution of disability 
rights, see Ravi Malhotra, “The Legal Genealogy of the Duty to Accommodate American and 
Canadian Workers with Disabilities: A Comparative Perspective” (2007) 23 Wash U.J.L. & Pol’y 1. 
27 Eaton, supra, note 25. 
28 Granovsky, supra, note 25. 
29 Eldridge, supra, note 25. 
30 Rosenbaum & Chadha, supra, note 1, at 356. 
31 Via Rail, supra, note 25. 
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parents, after a period in an integrated environment which the school 
board concluded was not successful nor in her best interests.32 As in 
cases involving racial segregation and inequality in education, disability 
discrimination in education strikes at the heart of what it means for 
people with disabilities to be included in society and the very core of 
dignity.33 Emily’s parents challenged the school board’s Identification, 
Placement and Review Committee decision through the administrative 
tribunal system established to adjudicate such decisions. The Special 
Education Appeal Board and the Special Education Tribunal considered 
Emily’s intellectual, emotional and social needs as well as possible safety 
concerns presented by her presence in an integrated classroom. They 
unanimously confirmed that the segregated placement was appropriate.34 
When the Eatons exhausted these remedies, they sought judicial re-
view while simultaneously placing Emily in an integrated setting through 
the local publicly funded Catholic school board.35 The Divisional Court 
rejected the notion that there ought to be a presumption in favour of 
educational integration of children with disabilities.36 Rather, it preferred 
that such decisions be made on a case-by-case basis. Granting deference 
to the administrative tribunals that had considered Emily’s case, the 
Divisional Court upheld the segregated placement.37 However, the Court 
of Appeal, in an excellent decision by Arbour J.A., as she then was, 
allowed the appeal. It took judicial notice of the historical and social 
context of segregation to conclude that a segregated environment 
amounted to the sort of exclusion and isolation that legally constituted a 
burden of disadvantage within the definition of section 15.38 It also 
rejected arguments by the school board that disability discrimination was 
simply distinguishable from race or sex discrimination because schools 
                                                                                                             
32 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 7. For a more in-depth treatment of Eaton, see Lepofsky, 
“The Charter’s Guarantee”, supra, note 13, at 197-211; Ravi Malhotra & Robin F. Hansen, “The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Implications for the 
Equality Rights of Canadians with Disabilities: The Case of Education” (2011) 29 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 73, at 93-94 [hereinafter “Malhotra & Hansen”]. 
33 The iconic case in the United States is of course Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). For a compelling discussion of how Brown relates to disability rights, see Beth A. Ferri 
& David J. Connor, Reading Resistance: Discourses of Exclusion in Desegregation and Inclusion 
Debates (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), at 23-39. 
34 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 8. Their arguments included the possibility that Emily 
might put dangerous objects in her mouth. How this would not also be a risk in a segregated 
environment is unclear. 
35 Lepofsky, “The Charter’s Guarantee”, supra, note 13. 
36 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 27. 
37 Id. 
38 Id., at para. 35. 
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had to teach students in accordance with their abilities or disabilities.39 In 
the section 1 analysis, Arbour J.A. concluded that the Education Act40 did 
not minimally impair Emily Eaton’s equality rights because it permitted a 
violation of her Charter rights. Therefore, the Education Act was to be 
interpreted consistently with Charter values. This meant placing students 
with disabilities in the least restrictive environment where parents did not 
consent to a segregated placement.41 
The Supreme Court allowed the school board’s appeal and concluded 
that the tribunal’s order did not violate section 15. The Court, speaking 
through Sopinka J., held that there ought to be no presumption of 
integration in evaluating how students with disabilities ought to be 
accommodated in education in line with their best interests because this 
would make proceedings more technical and adversarial.42 What is of 
particular interest for our purposes is the analysis used to understand 
disability discrimination. On the one hand, Sopinka J. makes very 
troubling distinctions between race or gender discrimination and disabil-
ity discrimination. First, he states that disability discrimination can be 
distinguished from race or gender discrimination because there is no 
individual variation in the case of race or gender discrimination.43 This 
seems prima facie inaccurate as a duty to accommodate applies to all 
grounds including gender. Any number of workplace standards may 
discriminate against some (but clearly not all) women who are physically 
incapable of meeting a particular standard.44 He also observes that 
disability discrimination is about accommodating people with disabilities 
and not about the attribution of stereotypical characteristics.45 In fact, 
disability discrimination encompasses both aspects. While there are no 
doubt accommodations that many people with disabilities require in 
                                                                                                             
39 Id., at para. 36. Justice Arbour correctly ruled that any such argument should only be 
considered during the s. 1 analysis. 
40 R.S.O. 1990, c. E.2. 
41 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 39. This follows the American statutory requirement that 
long preceded the Charter. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-142. 
42 Eaton, id., at para. 79. Justice Sopinka observes that it seems inconsistent that the Court 
of Appeal made a finding that segregated placements constitute a violation of s. 15 but would defer 
where parents of a child with disabilities selected the segregated placement. On this specific point, I 
would concur and question in a society committed to substantive equality how much deference 
should be given even to parents who select segregated settings. 
43 Id., at para. 69. 
44 This was the very issue in the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Meiorin, concerning 
accommodating a female firefighter who was incapable, like most women, of meeting the standards 
of the required aerobics test. See Meiorin, supra, note 13. 
45 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 67. 
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order to function effectively in school or in the workplace, people with 
disabilities are also subjected to stereotyped characteristics. One basic 
but disturbing example is the statistical data demonstrating that both 
medical professionals and able-bodied laypeople tend to evaluate the 
quality of life of people with disabilities significantly more poorly than 
do people with disabilities themselves.46 A second illustration is the 
growing literature on harassment of people with disabilities, indicating 
that one cannot neatly distinguish disability discrimination from other 
enumerated grounds.47 
The failure to create a presumption of integration also ignores, as 
Lepofsky has noted, the significant power differential between parents 
seeking to have their children placed in integrated settings and publicly 
funded school boards who have experienced legal counsel readily 
available.48 School boards have far greater resources to make legal 
arguments and have historically had a vested interest in operating 
segregated facilities for children with disabilities. Yet the Eaton Court 
rejects integration as the default norm without providing any sociological 
evidence that students with disabilities benefit from segregated settings.49 
This in effect creates a presumption in practical terms for segregated 
schooling once a school board decides that is appropriate. Parents seeking 
an integrated option are then placed in a situation where they will have to 
challenge the decision again and again.50 
Having said that, Sopinka J. also clearly demonstrates an understand-
ing of the social model of disablement. He comments that “it is the 
failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune society so that 
its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and banish-
ment of disabled persons from participation, which results in discrimina-
                                                                                                             
46 Carol Gill, “Health Professionals, Disability and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of 
Relevant Evidence and Reply to Batavia” (2000) 6 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 526, at 528-32; John 
Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, “Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement 
of Civil Lawsuits” (2008) 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, at 1532. 
47 See generally Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment (New York: New York University 
Press, 2007). 
48 Lepofsky, “The Charter’s Guarantee,” supra, note 13, at 204-205. 
49 Id., at 205-206. There is in fact an abundance of evidence about the disturbing nature of 
segregated education, ranging from deficient teaching to degrading practices such as mass medical 
examinations of students with disabilities in school gymnasia who were required to strip in order to 
train medical students. See Nancy Hansen, “Surmounting Perfect Body Syndrome: Women with 
Disabilities and the Medical Profession” in Houston Stewart, Beth Percival & Elizabeth R. Epperly, 
eds., The More We Get Together... (Charlottetown: Gynergy Books, 1992) 49, at 51. Disability rights 
advocates including parents of children with disabilities have every reason to be skeptical about 
claims that segregated environments are in the best interests of the child. 
50 Id., at 209. 
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tion against them”.51 In so doing, Sopinka J. recognizes the importance 
of a robust concept of equality that goes beyond treating likes alike and 
honours the promise articulated in the Charter. It is clearly an adoption of 
the social model in that it acknowledges that state actors, including 
school boards, are required to provide accommodations to students with 
disabilities that may entail changes to their structures, scheduling and 
services. Second, the Court properly rejected arguments by the school 
board that there was simply no discrimination in placing a student with a 
disability in a segregated environment within the Court’s section 15 
jurisprudence because this was, in fact, appropriate and authorized by the 
statutory framework.52 By using the language of segregation, the Court 
implicitly rejected arguments by the school board that excluding students 
with disabilities from regular classrooms ought not to be regarded as 
segregation.53 This too is an adoption of the social model and recognizes 
the harm that segregated environments can do for students with disabili-
ties. By refusing to create a hierarchy of rights and distinguishing racial 
discrimination and disability discrimination, the Court properly, despite 
the ultimate holding, took a view that adopted the social model. 
2. Granovsky 
A second loss for the disability rights community was the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Granovsky.54 Allan Granovsky was a man who had a 
long history of temporary and intermittent medical problems due to a 
back condition following a workplace accident. As a result, he did not 
satisfy the conditions to qualify for a permanent disability pension under 
the Canada Pension Plan55 that required contributions to be made in 
either two of the last three years or in five of the previous 10 years.56 
However, section 44(2) of the CPP, known as the drop-out provision, 
exempted those with permanent disabilities from making contributions. 
Granovsky alleged that the recency of contribution rules violated his 
equality rights under section 15 because his temporary disabilities 
                                                                                                             
51 Eaton, supra, note 25, at para. 67. 
52 Lepofsky, “The Charter’s Guarantee”, supra, note 13, at 200-01. 
53 Id., at 201. 
54 Granovsky, supra, note 25. I provide a more in-depth analysis of Granovsky in Ravi 
Malhotra, “Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and Equality Rights for People with 
Disabilities: Rethinking the Granovsky Decision” in J.E. Magnet and B. Adell, eds. (2009) 45 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 61. 
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 [hereinafter “CPP”]. 
56 Granovsky, supra, note 25, at para. 44. 
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prevented him from working and making the required contributions. In 
other words, the drop-out exemption was underinclusive. The Pension 
Appeals Board did not agree. Since Granovsky’s disabilities were 
temporary, he simply did not meet the statutory definition and was not 
entitled to an exemption according to the Pension Appeals Board.57 
The Federal Court of Appeal also concluded that the CPP ought to be 
upheld. Nevertheless, Stone J.A. found that the distinction contained in 
the legislation between people with disabilities and able-bodied people 
did violate section 15. Applying a section 1 analysis, the Court found that 
Parliament was best suited to engage in the intricate balancing that was 
required in this complex area of social welfare.58 
The Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Binnie J. and ar-
ticulating its first decision since the three-part Law test had been released 
for the interpretation of section 15,59 found that section 15 was not 
violated and dismissed Granovsky’s appeal despite the arguments of 
interveners such as the Council for Canadians with Disabilities.60 The 
Court began its reasons with the rather inauspicious remarks that it was 
unclear what the implications of a section 15 violation would be for 
future cases. Using a classic floodgates argument, the Court pondered 
whether a finding that people with temporary disabilities were discrimi-
nated against in the pension legislative scheme might lead to chaos in 
paratransit systems that provide door-to-door transportation for people 
with disabilities.61 
In applying the Law test, the Court found that while the first two 
branches of the test were met by Granovsky, he failed to demonstrate that 
his human dignity was harmed by the CPP in a manner inconsistent with 
his equality rights. The Court concluded that the legislative scheme made 
entirely legitimate distinctions and well-crafted exceptions in order to 
                                                                                                             
57 Id., at paras. 18-19. Concurring in the result, the Honourable C.R. McQuaid concluded 
that the scheme already distinguishes arbitrarily between those who have sustained a workplace 
injury and a much larger group whose injuries were sustained outside the workplace and are also 
precluded from contributing. 
58 Id., at paras. 20-23. Justice McDonald found that there was no s. 15 violation since the 
pension rules applied equally to all individuals. 
59 Law, supra, note 17, at para. 88. 
60 Granovsky, supra, note 25, at para. 3. The fact that the CCD embraced Mr. Granovsky, 
however, speaks well of its commitment to cross-disability politics, which is unfortunately not 
universal in the disability community. 
61 This particular comment is especially ironic given that virtually all paratransit systems in 
Canada are fraught with so much delay and so many bureaucratic rules that disability rights 
advocates have sought to ensure that regular transportation systems are accessible. For an overview 
of the problems with paratransit in Ontario, see Ena Chadha, “Running on Empty: The ‘Not So 
Special Status’ of Paratransit Services in Ontario” (2005) 20 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 1. 
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best serve those with permanent disabilities.62 In its view, Granovsky 
failed to show that the pension scheme undermined the dignity of people 
with temporary disabilities or their “legitimate aspirations to human self-
fulfilment”.63 The Court also suggested that Granovsky chose the wrong 
comparator group in arguing that his situation ought to be compared with 
able-bodied people. Stressing the importance of selecting the correct 
comparator group, the Court concluded that Granovsky ought to have 
compared his situation with those with permanent disabilities.64 Conse-
quently, there was no breach of his constitutional rights. 
There is no question that the formalistic reasoning employed in 
Granovsky was disappointing to disability advocates and marked a retreat 
from the original promise of substantive equality. The use of human 
dignity to undermine equality claims has been extensively critiqued in 
the human rights literature.65 Similarly, Gilbert and Majury have compel-
lingly shown the folly of substituting arbitrary comparator groups that 
make it harder for equality-seeking groups to prove their cases.66 I want 
to focus my energies, however, on the positive side of Granovsky. 
Despite its many problems, Binnie J. demonstrates a surprisingly sophisti-
cated understanding of models of disablement and the social model. He 
comments explicitly on the distinction between physiological impairment 
and socially created handicap, and notes the role of the Charter in 
seeking to redress such handicaps through accommodation. He accu-
rately observes that “[a] government inclination to write people off 
because of their impairment justifies scrutiny even if the impairment has 
resulted in very real functional limitations”.67 He even makes reference 
to the World Health Organization’s seminal classification document on 
                                                                                                             
62 The Court thus comments: 
Both the pension entitlement and the drop-out provision target a specific group of CPP 
contributors whose needs and circumstances correspond precisely to the purpose of the 
legislation. There is no such exact fit (or correspondence) between the drop-out provision 
and the appellant who experienced only bouts of temporary disability from time to time 
during the contribution period. 
See Granovsky, supra, note 25, at para. 61. 
63 Id., at para. 69.  
64 Id., at paras. 51-52. The Court specifically rejected arguments by the CCD that in a spe-
cific year, Granovsky was in fact permanently disabled. The Court instead evaluated his health status 
over the entire contribution period. It also rejected arguments that the comparator group ought to be 
between people with disabilities and able-bodied people. 
65 See Reaume, supra, note 21; Gilbert, “Time”, supra, note 21. 
66 Gilbert & Majury, “Critical”, supra, note 19. 
67 Granovsky, supra, note 25, at para. 37. 
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impairments, disabilities and handicaps that goes some distance to em-
bodying social model principles.68 
A second point to note is that the Granovsky Court accepts the 
claimant’s disabilities as legitimate. While he is ultimately unsuccessful, 
the Court does not question that Granovsky is a person with a disability 
and rejects arguments to the contrary.69 This is no small achievement. 
The American jurisprudence devoted years trying to resolve this ques-
tion.70 The broad Canadian definition of disability accepted and applied 
by dozens of human rights tribunals and labour arbitration panels and 
confirmed again in Granovsky has had a real impact on the lives of 
people with disabilities, particularly in the workplace context.71 This later 
culminated in the Supreme Court’s holding in Mercier, a case involving a 
gardener who was denied employment after a medical examination 
revealed that she had an anomaly in her spinal column that created no 
actual impairment, that there need not be a demonstrable impairment for 
a person to be able to claim disability discrimination where the medical 
diagnosis was clearly a factor in the employment decision.72 In achieving 
this understanding of disability rights, Binnie J. prepares fertile ground 
for future cases. 
3. Eldridge 
Perhaps the greatest legal victory for people with disabilities was the 
Court’s unanimous decision in Eldridge.73 The appellants were individu-
als who were born Deaf and used sign language as their means of 
communication. They argued that the lack of sign language interpretation 
impeded their ability to communicate with their physicians during 
medical care, particularly given the low literacy levels of many Deaf 
                                                                                                             
68 Id., at paras. 34-38. 
69 Id., at para. 52. 
70 For a good overview, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Subordination, Stigma, and ‘Disabili-
ty’” (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 397 (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the definition of 
disability). Eventually Congress had to enact new legislation in 2008 to remedy the issue, the 
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008. 
71 Michael Lynk, “Disability and the Duty to Accommodate: An Arbitrator’s Perspective” 
in Kevin Whitaker et al., eds., Labour Arbitration Yearbook, 2001-2002 (Toronto: Lancaster House, 
2002) 51, at 61-64 (noting that disability in Canadian human rights and labour arbitration law 
includes obesity, short stature, HIV, depression, alcoholism, hypertension, panic attacks, fear of 
flying, colour blindness and dyslexia, among other conditions). 
72 Mercier, supra, note 25. 
73 Eldridge, supra, note 25. 
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people, and therefore violated their equality rights under section 15.74 
The lower courts had all found in favour of the respondent Ministry.75 
Remarkably, the actual cost of sign language interpretation, about 
$150,000, was extremely small in proportion to the global provincial 
health budget, but the Ministry feared setting a precedent that would lead 
to the funding of interpreters for non-English speaking immigrants.76 
Justice La Forest, speaking for the Court, found that the Charter applied 
to decisions of the hospitals as they were engaged in discretionary 
decisions granted to them by statute in furtherance of a specific govern-
mental policy.77 He then concluded that section 15 was violated because 
effective communication was essential for the provision of quality 
medical services; a failure to communicate could lead to a patient’s 
inability to follow a course of treatment or even misdiagnosis with highly 
detrimental consequences.78 Once the state decides to provide a benefit, 
it must do so in a non-discriminatory manner where a failure to do so has 
an adverse effect on an enumerated group.79 To suggest, as did the 
respondents, that in a world without government-funded medical 
services, Deaf people would have been responsible for both paying 
physicians and paying for sign language interpretation is simply beside 
the point.80 The judgement was subject to highly negative attacks both in 
the popular media such as The Globe and Mail81 and by some legal 
scholars who regarded the case primarily through the prism of the 
powers of the judiciary to interfere with legislative choices that have 
significant fiscal implications.82 The reasoning in Eldridge embodies 
precisely the kind of analysis that disability rights advocates need: 
embracing a rich form of equality that recognizes that accommodation 
may have to be provided and existing practices modified in order for all 
                                                                                                             
74 Id., at paras. 5-8. Literacy would affect the ability to communicate via notes as an alternative. 
75 In dissent, Lambert J.A. of the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that s. 15 was 
violated but that the violation was saved by s. 1 given the need to accord deference to the legislature 
in making difficult policy choices about public finances. See id., at paras. 11-16.  
76 Id., at para. 4. The cost amounted to only approximately 0.0025 per cent of the provincial 
health budget. See id., at para. 87. 
77 Id., at para. 42. In a world of privatization, this doctrine is also of growing importance. I 
cannot develop the full implications of a deconstruction of the public/private distinction in the 
available space. For the classic interpretation, see Karl Klare, “The Public/Private Distinction in 
Labour Law” (1982) 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1358. 
78 Eldridge, id., at para. 69. 
79 Id., at paras. 79-80. 
80 Id., at paras. 68. 
81 David Beatty, “Canadian Constitutional Law in a Nutshell” (1998) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 605, 
at para. 24. 
82 See, e.g., id., at paras. 24-25. 
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to flourish. The challenge is to ensure that such reasoning is systemati-
cally applied in future cases.83 
Nevertheless, some attention should be paid to the issue of remedies. 
In Eldridge, the Court simply issued a declaration of unconstitutionality 
without specifying a precise remedy.84 It also delayed the effect of the 
declaration for six months to allow the British Columbia provincial 
government to enact solutions for sign language interpretation in line 
with the Court’s ruling.85 As Roach has correctly noted, however, 
transferring the remedial aspect back to the legislature poses particular 
problems in equality rights cases, which have typically lasted years by 
the time they reach the Supreme Court, involving vulnerable minorities 
who may be justifiably skeptical that the political process will effectively 
work for them.86 Although British Columbia made some efforts to 
provide sign language interpretation, first via a toll-free line and eventu-
ally via the provision of sign language interpreters upon request to attend 
physician and hospital visits, there is evidence that dozens of Deaf or 
hard-of-hearing patients in other provinces such as Ontario have filed 
human rights complaints about a continued lack of access.87 This 
highlights the limitation of even the most positive legal ruling for social 
transformation if the political will is not there to enforce effective 
remedies that create accessible realities on the ground. 
4. Via Rail 
Finally, while it is not a Charter decision, the narrow victory of dis-
ability rights activists in the Supreme Court in 2007 by a margin of 5-4 in 
                                                                                                             
83 Clearly, this challenge is significant. In Auton, supra, note 11, the Supreme Court dis-
missed a claim that the British Columbia government’s failure to provide funding for Applied 
Behavioural Analysis (“ABA”) for children with autism, an emerging therapy, violated the Charter. 
The Court distinguished its analysis in Eldridge, supra, note 25, holding that Auton concerned access 
to a benefit that was not conferred by law, rather than unequal access to medical services given to 
all. The Court then ruled that even if ABA was a benefit provided by law, there would be no s. 15 
violation because the complainants selected the wrong comparator group. Although Auton was 
decided in part through the now discredited comparator group reasoning, it still reflects a significant 
retreat that is worrisome for equality rights advocates. 
84 Eldridge, id., at para. 96. 
85 Id. 
86 Kent Roach, “Remedial Consensus and Dialogue Under the Charter: General Declara-
tions and Delayed Declarations of Invalidity” (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 211, at para. 20. Indeed, the 
Charter claimant has spent years in litigation at this point precisely because the government was 
found to be violating her Charter rights. 
87 Id., at paras. 26-28. 
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Via Rail warrants careful attention from legal scholars.88 The case 
concerned a complaint by the Council of Canadians with Disabilities to 
the Canadian Transportation Agency (“CTA”) that the purchase of 139 
railway cars, known as the Renaissance cars, by Via Rail constituted 
undue obstacles for people with disabilities in violation of section 172 of 
the Canada Transportation Act.89 The CTA has jurisdiction over accessi-
bility concerns in transportation for people with disabilities. It succeeded 
the Canadian Transportation Commission and it has applied Charter 
equality values in a number of cases with respect to transportation 
accessibility for people with disabilities, including the provision of an 
additional free seat for those people with disabilities who require 
attendants to travel.90 This bodes well for advocates of disability rights, 
as it brings the adjudication of constitutional principles closer to people’s 
everyday lives by enabling administrative tribunals to more rapidly 
address equality rights issues.91 
In its Via Rail complaint, the CCD enumerated some 46 deficiencies 
with the railway cars including, inter alia, inaccessibility of its sleeper 
cars, lack of access to washrooms, inaccessibility of the economy coach 
cars which required wheelchair users to use special on-board wheel-
chairs, and inadequate accommodation for those with visual impairments 
and who used service animals.92 The Renaissance cars were also signifi-
cantly less accessible than the existing fleet which they were to replace.93 
Via Rail took the position that modifications for wheelchair access were 
too expensive and that its staff could deliver meals to customers who 
were wheelchair users and assist them in using the washroom.94 After a 
lengthy investigation taking up nearly three years and various prelimi-
nary orders, the CTA concluded that 30 of the 139 railway cars had to be 
                                                                                                             
88 Via Rail, supra, note 25. For a comprehensive discussion, see David Baker & Sarah 
Godwin, “ALL ABOARD!: The Supreme Court of Canada Confirms that Canadians with 
Disabilities Have Substantive Equality Rights” (2008) 71 Sask. L. Rev. 39 [hereinafter “Baker & 
Godwin”]. 
89 S.C. 1996, c. 10. The CTA has authority to hear complaints about accessibility in federal-
ly regulated transportation. Section 5 of the Act sets out a National Transportation Policy that is 
committed to accessibility for people with disabilities. 
90 Baker & Godwin, supra, note 88, at para. 6. 
91 The debate within administrative law on the appropriate scope of the power of adminis-
trative tribunals in evaluating formal constitutional challenges, which was not in issue in Via Rail, is 
well beyond the scope of this paper. But see Martin, supra, note 25 (holding that a workers’ 
compensation tribunal may decide Charter questions where it is explicitly or impliedly authorized to 
decide questions of law). 
92 Via Rail, supra, note 25, at para. 18. 
93 Id., at para. 36. 
94 Id., at para. 11. 
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modified to enable wheelchair users to be able to use their own wheel-
chairs independently in the railway car in using its washrooms.95 The net 
cost to Via Rail was determined to be under $700,000, or equivalent to 
the lost revenue the company accepted by accommodating passengers 
who wear coats.96 The Agency also found that Via Rail had been ex-
tremely uncooperative in providing timely technical information regard-
ing cost estimates during its investigation.97 This was only the start of an 
epic battle that would nearly bring the CCD to the point of bankruptcy.98 
The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the CTA in a 
disappointing decision indicating how far disability rights advocates still 
have to go. Justice Sexton for the majority concluded that the Agency 
was entitled to limited deference on human rights issues and failed to 
consider Via Rail’s arguments about the accessibility of the network as a 
whole and the interests of passengers without disabilities.99 In other 
words, the fact that Jill uses a wheelchair and wants to travel on an 
inaccessible route from Halifax to Toronto is irrelevant so long as 
accessible routes exist somewhere in the entire network. Such a perspec-
tive is blatantly inconsistent with equality values that the Charter seeks to 
promote. The Federal Court of Appeal as a whole also found that the 
Agency wrongly violated Via Rail’s procedural fairness rights by not 
giving it adequate opportunity to respond to the Agency’s requests for 
information on cost and feasibility.100 It remitted the case to the Agency 
for reconsideration in light of both additional evidence that Via Rail 
proffered and its arguments about accessibility to the network as a 
whole.101 
The five-person majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through 
Abella J. and joined by McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache, LeBel and 
Charron JJ., held that given that the CTA is a highly specialized agency 
with a particular mandate, it ought to have been granted deference on 
human rights issues that concern transportation, as intended by Parlia-
ment.102 It went on to find that the CTA decision correctly evaluated the 
factors in play, including the financial impact of wheelchair access on 
                                                                                                             
95 Id., at para. 6. 
96 Id., at paras. 70-71. 
97 Id., at paras. 5-7. 
98 Baker & Godwin, supra, note 88, at para. 1. 
99 Via Rail, supra, note 25, at para. 76. 
100 Id., at para. 79. 
101 Id., at para. 82. 
102 Id., at para. 97. The Court noted at para. 98 that the “scheme and object of the Act are the 
oxygen the Agency breathes”. 
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Via Rail, in assessing whether removal of the barriers constituted an 
unreasonable burden, and did so in a manner consistent with Canadian 
human rights legislation.103 It specifically found that the CTA appropri-
ately considered the fact that the purchase of the railway cars violated 
the comprehensive Rail Code, a voluntary agreement on accessibility 
standards to which Via Rail had itself agreed in consultation with the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission, disability advocacy organizations 
such as the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, and the CTA.104 The 
majority also expressly articulated an understanding of the social model 
in approving of the CTA’s ruling that the cars must be accessible to 
individuals using their personal wheelchairs. Wheelchairs are generally 
customized to the specific person’s needs and the notion that Via Rail 
could substitute a generic wheelchair was inconsistent with both dignity 
and practices across leading Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development countries with respect to railway systems.105 
Perhaps most importantly for further disability rights jurisprudence, 
the majority rejected the respondent’s argument about the network 
defence. The majority correctly understood that Canadians with disabili-
ties elect to travel to particular locations and that the accessibility of 
other routes is completely irrelevant to a wheelchair user faced with a 
barrier. The fact that Via Rail had no clear answer as to how they would 
provide accommodations apart from the use of taxis or the demeaning 
and unsafe option of physically transferring wheelchair users did not help 
its case.106 The majority therefore lambasted the majority of the Federal 
Court of Appeal for being inattentive to the duty to accommodate 
principles set forth in cases such as Meiorin.107 Without discussing every 
nuance of this complex decision, with respect to the specific accommo-
dations required, the Court appropriately placed significant weight on 
the fact that Via Rail was so uncooperative in providing information on 
cost estimates when it had the onus to demonstrate that it was complying 
with its duty to accommodate passengers with disabilities.108 The onus is 
clearly on the respondent to demonstrate that the accommodation would 
                                                                                                             
103 Id., at para. 139; Baker & Godwin, supra, note 88, at para. 53. 
104 Id., at paras. 145-150, 163. 
105 Id., at paras. 151-165 (noting American, British and Australian practices). A personal 
wheelchair is typically customized to meet the ergonomic needs of the client. Stripping the person 
with a disability of such a tool is consequently very invasive and demeaning. 
106 Id., at paras. 174-176. 
107 Id., at para. 189. 
108 See, e.g., id., at para. 200. 
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constitute an undue obstacle.109 Similarly, Via Rail’s obstructionist 
conduct largely led the majority to reject that it experienced any proce-
dural unfairness with respect to evidence on the cost of accommodation, 
such as the Schrum report, that it proffered at the Federal Court of 
Appeal, since the majority properly concluded that Via Rail should have 
disclosed such information earlier to the CTA.110 
In dissent, Deschamps and Rothstein JJ., joined by Fish and Binnie 
JJ., held that when applying human rights principles, the Agency did not 
have specialized expertise and was only entitled to deference on a 
standard of correctness, the lowest standard of deference.111 The dissent 
also declined to consider the voluntary Rail Code as a legally binding 
instrument to which it would accord deference because it had not been 
adopted by the Governor in Council as a formal regulation.112 Its primary 
focus was on the difficult financial situation faced by Via Rail and how 
that ought to be a significant factor when weighing the competing consid-
erations. Indeed, the dissent found that the majority did not properly 
apply the Meiorin test in failing to give sufficient weight to Via Rail’s 
purpose of efficiency and maintaining viability as stipulated in its enabling 
statute.113 Accordingly, the dissent would have remitted the case back to 
the CTA.114 Fortunately for disability rights advocates, the majority 
properly stressed the primacy of human rights and gave it a robust 
interpretation. Advocates can effectively use the majority judgment in 
Via Rail in future challenges in the coming years. In Part IV, I turn to 
some key trends that are likely to affect how we interpret future disability 
rights litigation. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: THE CRPD AND THE AODA 
Two recent developments that merit careful consideration by legal 
advocates are the CRPD and the AODA. Although a full treatment is 
well beyond the scope of this paper, legal advocates would be well 
advised to pay close attention to how case law under each instrument 
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unfolds. The CRPD, enacted in 2006, entered into force May 3, 2008 and 
ratified by Canada in 2010 at the beginning of the Paralympic Games, 
was the fastest negotiated international human rights convention in the 
world and specifically addresses equality rights of people with disabili-
ties in some 50 articles.115 It encompasses a wide range of rights that 
protect the person, autonomy rights, rights of access to participation, 
liberty rights and economic, social and cultural rights, and is fully 
grounded in the social model perspective of empowerment and barrier 
removal.116 It also establishes, as have other major international human 
rights conventions, an Optional Protocol to facilitate individual or group 
complaints against a state party that are reviewed by the treaty monitor-
ing body, the Committee of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a 
group of some 12 experts who serve four-year terms.117 Regrettably, 
Canada has yet to sign the Optional Protocol nor has Parliament enacted 
implementing legislation specifically designed for the CRPD.118 
Although state parties undertook to create no new rights, in reality, 
there are some innovative aspects of the CRPD that may assist disability 
rights advocates. Article 19, for instance, establishes a right to attendant 
services.119 Article 20 outlines a right to personal mobility.120 This includes 
a right to affordable assistive technology and training in its use.121 Article 
24 concerns education and has specific contextualized language about 
the inclusion of people with disabilities. It states in part that State Parties 
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119 CRPD, supra, note 6, Art. 19. 
120 Id., Art. 20. 
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shall ensure that “people with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality 
and free primary and secondary education on an equal basis with others 
in the community in which they live”.122 On its face, this is a potentially 
powerful tool in future cases involving the integration of students with 
disabilities in educational settings. Creative counsel could do much with 
these provisions to advance the equality rights of people with disabilities. 
While relatively few Canadian cases have considered the CRPD to date, 
counsel are likely to craft arguments based on the CRPD in the years to 
come.123 I would argue that the future interpretation of section 15 must 
be carefully considered in light of Canada’s responsibilities under the 
CRPD, especially as courts have embraced the application of interna-
tional law in other contexts such as the landmark immigration law 
rulings in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)124 
and Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).125 While, 
as I discuss below, legislatures have a clear role to play in crafting 
disability-specific legislation that enumerates specific accessibility rights 
for people with disabilities, the bold interventions of courts in recent 
years in applying international human rights conventions in the interpre-
tation of domestic law suggests that the CRPD will play an increasingly 
important role and counsel would be well advised to pay it close atten-
tion and employ it as a tool to deepen equality whenever they can. 
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(holding that deportation to a state where the appellant may be tortured may be interpreted in light of 
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Finally, the AODA legislation enacted in 2005 in Ontario opens up 
a new arena for activism that warrants close attention by legal counsel 
and the disability community throughout Canada. Although not all 
regulations have been released, the AODA seeks to emulate the success 
of the American experience with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
as an alternative to the complaint-based human rights system which 
many disability rights advocates rightly perceive as a failure.126 It 
outlines regulations in a number of areas including customer service, 
transportation, employment, information and communications, and the 
built environment.127 The Customer Service Standard regulation came 
into effect on January 1, 2012 and requires organizations with more than 
20 employees to have a written plan on their strategies for accessible 
customer service and to file it with the Ministry.128 The standards relating 
to transportation, employment, and information and communications 
were consolidated in a single Integrated Accessibility Standards Regula-
tion that is in effect.129 However, actual requirements are to be phased in 
over the next decade.130 Finally, the Built Environment Standard has yet 
to be promulgated.131 Collectively, these highly specific regulations, a 
reflection of compromises among the various stakeholders, open up new 
vistas for disability rights advocates that can work in tandem with 
equality rights claims and human rights arguments to achieve a better 
solution for Canadians. Their potential, in conjunction with the CRPD, to 
transform disability rights law is significant and advocates should be 
prepared to make the most of them and hopefully enact analogous 
provisions throughout the country. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While section 15 has undoubtedly had a troubled history, I believe 
that a cautiously optimistic approach is warranted on the facts in the case 
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of disability rights. Although disability rights advocates have certainly 
not always won at the Supreme Court of Canada, the language used by 
judges even in cases where they have not found section 15 to be violated 
holds out promise for future rights claimants. Again and again, judges 
have demonstrated that they have an understanding of the social model 
and have applied it to rectify the effect of structural barriers, discrimina-
tory regulations and attitudes that unfairly impede the lives of people 
with disabilities. I am hopeful that initiatives such as the CRPD and 
the AODA can breathe new life into disability rights law for future 
generations. 
  
